Action and perception in social contexts by Pfister, Roland et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 02 September 2014
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00667
Action and perception in social contexts: intentional
binding for social action effects
Roland Pfister1*, Sukhvinder S. Obhi2, Martina Rieger3, 4 and Dorit Wenke4, 5
1 Department of Psychology III, Julius Maximilians University of Würzburg, Würzburg, Germany
2 Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON, Canada
3 Institute for Psychology, UMIT, University for Health Sciences, Medical Informatics and Technology, Hall in Tirol, Austria
4 Department of Psychology, Max-Planck-Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany
5 Department of Psychology, Humboldt University at Berlin, Berlin, Germany
Edited by:
James W. Moore, Goldsmiths,
University of London, UK
Reviewed by:
Simandeep Poonian, The University
of Queensland, Australia
Vince Polito, Macquarie University,
Australia
*Correspondence:
Roland Pfister, Department of
Psychology III, Julius Maximilians
University of Würzburg, Röntgenring
11, 97070 Würzburg, Germany
e-mail: roland.pfister@
psychologie.uni-wuerzburg.de
The subjective experience of controlling events in the environment alters the perception
of these events. For instance, the interval between one’s own actions and their
consequences is subjectively compressed—a phenomenon known as intentional binding.
In two experiments, we studied intentional binding in a social setting in which actions of
one agent prompted a second agent to perform another action. Participants worked in
pairs and were assigned to a “leader” and a “follower” role, respectively. The leader’s
key presses triggered (after a variable interval) a tone and this tone served as go signal
for the follower to perform a keypress as well. Leaders and followers estimated the
interval between the leader’s keypress and the following tone, or the interval between the
tone and the follower’s keypress. The leader showed reliable intentional binding for both
intervals relative to the follower’s estimates. These results indicate that human agents
experience a pre-reflective sense of agency for genuinely social consequences of their
actions.
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INTRODUCTION
The physical world is quite simple, at least when considering how
it can be affected by one’s own actions: Pressing a light switch in a
dark hallway will turn on the light just as reliably as jumping into
a puddle will make some water splash around. In other words:
Every action an agent chooses to perform will produce certain
effects in the environment, and these effects can be predicted with
ease in many cases. Actively bringing about an action effect in the
environment gives rise to sense of agency, the subjective experience
of controlling one’s actions and, through them, events in the out-
side world (Haggard and Tsakiris, 2009). A major precondition
for sense of agency to arise is a high contingency between actions
and following effects (Metcalfe and Greene, 2007; Moore et al.,
2009a). As the above examples show, the physical world offers
almost ideal preconditions for feeling control over various ensu-
ing events, while at the same time being able to tell which events
escape one’s own influence.
By contrast, matters become more complicated when consid-
ering social consequences of own actions: Human actions often
aim at changing the behavior of another agent, and in this situa-
tion, the action’s exact effects do not only depend on the action
itself but also on how the other agent actually responds to it.
Interestingly, sense of agency has not yet been studied for actions
that explicitly aim at influencing another agent’s behavior. The
present study therefore addressed this issue by measuring a spe-
cific, pre-reflective component of sense of agency that is known
as intentional binding (Haggard et al., 2002). Before describing
these experiments, we give a brief overview of different measures
of sense of agency and of previous studies on sense of agency in
social contexts that involved two individuals jointly producing a
given effect.
MEASURING SENSE OF AGENCY
Sense of agency can be measured directly and indirectly (Haggard
and Tsakiris, 2009). Direct measures of sense of agency are usu-
ally obtained via self-reports in terms of judgments of agency
on a predefined rating scale (e.g., Wegner et al., 2004; Sato and
Yasuda, 2005; Wenke et al., 2010). Obviously, these measures
draw on reflective aspects of sense of agency that are available
to introspection. Thus, they have often been viewed as captur-
ingmainly processes of retrospective inference which compare the
match between current intention and an experienced effect (e.g.,
Wegner, 2003).
Indirect measures, by contrast, aim to assess pre-reflective cor-
relates of agency, and the phenomenon of intentional binding
is one of these correlates (for an overview of indirect measures,
see Haggard and Tsakiris, 2009). Intentional binding refers to
the finding that the perceived time interval between voluntary
actions and ensuing perceptual events is subjectively compressed
(Haggard et al., 2002; Moore and Haggard, 2008; but see Buehner
and Humphreys, 2009; Buehner, 2012). It has been argued that
intentional binding strongly depends on pre-reflective processes
that do not require self-referential processing. In particular, inten-
tional binding was suggested to reflect the low-level sensorimotor
basis of sense of agency (Moore and Obhi, 2012) and might pri-
marily reflect what Synofzik et al. (2008) refer to as “feelings
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of agency.” Compared to explicit self-report judgments, indi-
rect measures of sense of agency such as intentional binding are
assumed to be less affected by prior beliefs about who is in control
(but see Desantis et al., 2011). Therefore, intentional binding and
explicit agency judgments seem to capture at least partly differ-
ent processes and might yield diverging results in some situations
(Ebert and Wegner, 2010; for a review, see Moore and Obhi,
2012). This is not to say however that intentional binding depends
on predictive processes alone. Previous studies have shown that
intentional binding depends on both, efferent motor prediction
and retrospective inference that occurs right after an agent expe-
riences a certain effect to result from his or her action (Moore and
Haggard, 2008; Moore et al., 2009a). Thus, our use of the term
“pre-reflective” aims at distinguishing processes that are captured
by indirect measures rather than by direct self-reports, without
implying a particular interpretation in terms of predictive or
retrospective mechanisms.
SENSE OF AGENCY IN SOCIAL INTERACTION
Previous studies on sense of agency in social interaction focused
on settings that were explicitly designed to be highly ambigu-
ous about which of two agents had caused a certain event.
Such ambiguous settings allow investigating whether agents may
attribute authorship for an event to themselves even if this event
was actually caused by someone else. And indeed, such “vicar-
ious” agency has been demonstrated in different experimental
contexts (Nielsen, 1963; Wegner and Wheatley, 1999; Wegner
et al., 2004). For instance, Wegner and Wheatley (1999) asked
two actors to perform a joint (mouse) movement and each actor
could stop the mouse cursor at a time of his or her choosing. After
stopping, participants provided direct judgments of agency about
the stopping action. Interestingly, they reported a high degree of
agency even when the other actor had actually stopped the move-
ment, provided that the effect of the stopping action (the mouse
cursor resting on a particular object on the screen) corresponded
to an auditory prime naming that object prior to the action.
In addition to introspective self-reports of sense of agency,
Obhi and colleagues recently suggested that sense of agency in
social situations may also include pre-reflective processes as mea-
sured via intentional binding (Strother et al., 2010; Obhi and
Hall, 2011a,b). Similar to an experiment byWegner andWheatley
(1999), the participants of Obhi and Hall (2011a) jointly engaged
in a task (pressing the space bar on a computer keyboard), which
in turn produced a joint effect (a tone). Both participants placed
their index finger on one end of the space bar and were encour-
aged to press the key at a time of their choosing. If the other
participant initiated the keypress first, they were to join in and
press the space bar down as well. In addition to explicit judg-
ments of agency, these authors also assessed intentional binding
and found reliable binding effects for both, self-initiated and
other-initiated actions. Interestingly though, explicit self-reports
of agency differed, such that only those individuals who actually
initiated the key press reported being responsible for the outcome.
Overall, these results suggest that intentional binding might not
be restricted to own actions. Instead, it might also occur for
another person’s actions, at least when agents jointly produce an
effect that matches the individual’s intention.
CONTROLLING OTHER PEOPLE: THE PRESENT EXPERIMENTS
In the present experiments, we investigated sense of agency in a
different social situation: Rather than creating ambiguity about
who had caused a certain effect in the environment, we set up
a situation in which one of two agents clearly was the “leader”
and prompted a second participant, the “follower,” to carry out
an action. That is, both agents performed their own distinctive
actions with the action of the follower being triggered by the leader
action. In fact, such situations are very common in everyday inter-
actions. For example, someone might ask another person to open
a window or, in organizational settings, a person higher up in the
hierarchy might prompt his or her subordinates to carry out a
certain task. In such situations, the leader clearly affects the fol-
lower’s action although, of course, the follower is immediately
responsible for initiating and performing it. As outlined above,
the follower’s action is not as predictable as action effects in the
physical world tend to be, neither in terms of timing (contiguity)
nor in terms of actual occurrence (contingency). It is thus unclear,
whether pre-reflective components of sense of agency—as mea-
sured via intentional binding—arise for such social action effects.
Finding intentional binding for the leader regarding the follower’s
action would indicate that the representation of the follower’s
action potentially affected low-level predictive motor processes,
similar to situations in which one’s own action causes predictable
effects in the physical environment (Haggard et al., 2002).
Supporting evidence for this speculation comes from a recent
study on the role of anticipated social action effects for effect-
based action control (Pfister et al., 2013). In this study, two
participants also worked on a task in which one of them was
the designated leader and the other was the designated follower.
The leader performed a long or short keypress in response to
an imperative stimulus on a computer screen that only he or
she was able to see. In different blocks, the follower either imi-
tated the leader’s action (e.g., performing a short keypress in
response to a short keypress of the leader), or counter-imitated
the leader’s action (performing a long keypress in response to
a short keypress of the leader). The leader showed better per-
formance, i.e., faster responses, in the imitation condition as
compared to the counter-imitation condition. Because the fol-
lower’s imitation or counter-imitation response only occurred
after the leader action, these findings indicate that anticipated
changes of the follower’s behavior affected the leader’s action
planning. The results of Pfister et al. (2013) thus suggest that
social action effects may indeed become integrated in action con-
trol. This, in turn, might give rise to intentional binding for these
effects (for additional comments on effect-based action control
in social settings, see Ray and Welsh, 2011; Pfister et al., 2014).
We tested this prediction in two experiments in which two par-
ticipants acted interdependently in a simple action sequence (see
Figure 1).
One participant, the leader, started the action sequence by
pressing a key. After a variable interval, an effect tone was pre-
sented which served as a go signal for the follower to also press
a key. The interval between the leader’s keypress and the onset of
the effect tone, termed the leader’s action-tone-interval (L-ATI),
as well as the interval between the tone and the follower’s key-
press, termed follower’s tone-action-interval (F-TAI; i.e., his or
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FIGURE 1 | Setup and trial procedure of Experiment 1 and 2. Participants
sat next to each other and operated one response key each. One participant
acted as the leader of an action sequence whereas the other participant
acted as the follower: The leader initiated the action sequence at leisure after
an exclamation mark had disappeared from the computer screen. The leader
action triggered an effect tone after a variable action-effect interval of
100–600ms. This tone also served as a go signal for the follower. The
follower’s action triggered an effect tone in Experiment 2, but not in
Experiment 1. At the end of the trial, either the leader or the follower had to
estimate the duration of either the leader’s action-tone interval (L-ATI), the
interval between the tone and the follower’s action (F-TAI), or (Experiment 2
only) the follower’s action-tone interval (F-ATI).
her response time) were estimated by both, leader and follower
(for previous uses of interval estimation tasks in research on
temporal binding, see Engbert and Wohlschläger, 2007; Engbert
et al., 2007, 2008; Moore et al., 2009b; Wenke and Haggard,
2009; Humphreys and Buehner, 2010). Intentional binding for
the leader would become evident in terms of giving shorter inter-
val estimates than the follower. Based on the above argument,
we expected to observe intentional binding for the leader not
only for his or her action effect in the physical environment (the
action-contingent tone), but also for the ensuing action of the
follower.
EXPERIMENT 1: INTENTIONAL BINDING FOR SOCIAL
ACTION EFFECTS
In Experiment 1, we investigated whether different roles in a social
setting, i.e., being a leader or a follower, results in different rep-
resentations of the actions conducted in this setting. Specifically,
we were interested in whether the leader, whose action prompted
the follower to react, would represent the follower’s action in the
same way the leader represents other effects of the own action.
To investigate whether the representation of such action effects
is mirrored in indirect measures of sense of agency, we assessed
intentional binding in terms of direct interval estimates (see also
Figure 1). The to-be-estimated interval on a given trial was pre-
specified, whereas a cue at the end of the trial indicated who was
to judge. We expected intentional binding for the leader’s effect
tone to be mirrored in shorter interval estimates for the leader
estimating the L-ATI than for the follower estimating the L-ATI.
Further, if the follower’s response is also coded as an additional
action effect for the leader, the leader should perceive this event
to occur earlier in time than the follower, giving rise to shorter
estimates for the F-TAI, too. We thus predicted shorter interval
estimates by leaders than by followers, not only with regard to the
first interval (L-ATI) but, more importantly, also for the second
one (F-TAI).
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-eight volunteers from the city of Leipzig were paid for
participation (8 males; all right-handed; mean age = 22.9 years).
All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision
and hearing and were naive as to the purpose of the experiment.
The two participants of each session were of the same gender.
The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki and the procedures were approved by the local ethics
committee.
Material, apparatus, and procedure
The two participants of each pair worked together in front of
a 17′′ monitor and operated one response key each with their
right hand. The keys were mounted safely on the table and were
connected to the computer via the parallel port. A second mon-
itor was turned sideways to the experimenter and could not be
observed by the participants.
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Participants received written instructions and were told that
their task was to estimate the length of either of the two intervals
(in ms) and that the to-be-judged interval (i.e., either L-ATI or
F-TAI) was constant for each block of trials. They were assigned
to the roles of leader and follower and were informed that their
roles would change after the first half of the experiment. Across
participant pairs, we counterbalanced whether the left- or right-
sitting participant started as leader.
Figure 1 shows a schematic of an experimental trial. Each trial
started with the presentation of a white exclamation mark in the
center of the screen (20 pt Arial font). After a delay of 500ms,
the exclamation mark disappeared and the program waited for
the leader’s key press. Leaders pressed their key at a time of their
choosing. The leader’s key press triggered an effect tone that
appeared after a random action-tone interval between 100 and
600ms drawn from a uniform distribution. This was done in
order to match typical RTs of previous experiments with compa-
rable settings (Engbert et al., 2007, 2008). However, participants
were told that the interval varied between 1 and 1000ms, and
they were similarly informed that typical reaction times are in
the range of up to 1000ms. Sinusoidal tones with a duration of
50ms and a frequency of 400 and 800Hz served as auditory action
effects. Tones were presented via two loudspeakers that stood to
the right and to the left of the monitor, and the pitch of the tone
depended on the key that was pressed. Because each pair of par-
ticipants had a fixed sitting order and only operated one key each,
this implied that the tones were participant-specific for the dura-
tion of the entire experiment. The assignment of tones to keys was
counterbalanced across participant pairs.
The tone served as go-signal for the follower and the program
waited for a maximum of 1000ms for the follower’s key press.
Then, after an additional SOA of 500ms, the judgment screen was
presented (see Figure 1). The judgment screen consisted of two
matchstick men and either the left or the right matchstick man
was marked by an orange box to indicate the judge in the cur-
rent trial. That is, participants only learned at the end of each trial
whose turn it was to judge the interval, to ensure that both partici-
pants always paid attention to the events at all times. Additionally,
the judgment screen contained a number above the matchstick
men that reminded participants which interval to judge (“1” for
the L-ATI, “2,” for the F-TAI). The to-be-judged intervals were
blocked such that participants knew in advance which interval
to focus on. The order of to-be-judged intervals was counterbal-
anced across participant pairs, but remained constant for the two
experimental halves for each pair.
Participants gave their interval judgments orally, and the
experimenter noted the time estimates and initiated the next trial.
Anticipations (leader actions before the exclamation mark dis-
appeared, follower reactions before tone onset), omissions (fol-
lower’s reaction time > 1000ms), or wrong order of keystrokes
(follower before leader), triggered a warning message on the
screen and the next trial started afterward. These trials were
removed from the analyses.
Each experimental half started with three different practice
blocks that allowed participants to familiarize themselves with
the task in each role (leader, follower). The first practice block
comprised 10 trials in which participants only had to press the
keys in the correct order without estimating the interval length.
This block was followed by two additional training blocks of 20
trials (each pertaining to one of the intervals) during which the
participants were instructed to make interval estimates. In these
two training blocks, the experimenter gave vague feedback about
the judgments by classifying the to-be judged intervals as short,
medium, and long (and shorter/longer than the previous inter-
val). To this end, the actual interval length was displayed on the
experimenter’s monitor throughout the experiment. Data of the
training blocks were not analyzed.
After the training blocks, two test blocks of 20 trials each
were performed for each interval (totaling to 20 interval estimates
for each combination of interval and judge). Both blocks relat-
ing to a specific interval immediately followed each other and
the sequence of intervals matched the sequence of the training
blocks. Thus, if the participants judged the L-ATI in the first train-
ing block and F-TAI in the second training block, they started
with two blocks of L-ATI judgments and continued with two
blocks of F-TAI judgments. The interval sequence was counter-
balanced across participant pairs. The fourth test block marked
the end of the first half of the experiment and was followed
by a longer break before participants continued with changed
roles.
RESULTS
The first trial of each block and trials with errors (4.3%) were
excluded from data analysis. For the remaining test trials, we com-
puted binding scores by subtracting the actual interval length
from the respective interval estimate; negative binding scores thus
indicate a subjective compression of the interval. These bind-
ing scores were then subjected to an outlier correction for each
participant and condition (|z|> 2.5; 1.0%).
Preliminary analyses examined the correlation of binding
scores and actual interval lengths across all trials for each partic-
ipant. These correlations were submitted to a Fisher-Z transfor-
mation, averaged across participants, and re-transformed after-
ward. This analysis yielded a strong mean correlation indicating
more pronounced binding for longer intervals, r = 0.60, with
the mean Z-value differing significantly from zero, t(27) = 11.28,
p < 0.001. Such a correlation might introduce potential con-
founds to any analysis of the raw binding scores because, unlike
in most previous studies, our design did not allow for match-
ing interval lengths across all conditions. This potential confound
becomes evident when considering a session in which the par-
ticular follower responds very slowly as compared to most other
participants: Such a slow response time (that cannot be manip-
ulated experimentally) might be sufficient to introduce various
biases in the obtained interval estimates from both participants
and thus distort the pattern of results. We therefore decided to
perform an analysis of regression residuals instead of analyz-
ing the raw binding scores, even though the raw binding scores
yielded a similar pattern (with profound underestimation for all
conditions except for the follower estimating the F-TAI, see Table
A1 in the Supplementary Material).
Such analyses of regression residuals are performed in two
steps (cf. Maxwell et al., 1985; Pfister, 2011). In the first step,
we calculated a linear regression for each individual participant
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to estimate the impact of the interval length on binding scores
(irrespective of the experimental condition). The scores predicted
by the regression analysis were then compared to the actual bind-
ing scores to calculate the regression residuals, i.e., the portion
of the interval estimate that could not be accounted for by the
interval length itself. We then submitted the mean regression
residuals to a 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors
judge (leader vs. follower) and to-be-judged interval (L-ATI vs.
F-TAI).
As hypothesized, participants gave shorter interval estimates
for both intervals when acting as leader than when acting as
follower (Figure 2, left panel), F(1,27) = 7.65, p = 0.010, η2p =
0.22. Additionally, the first interval was consistently judged to be
shorter than the second interval by both judges, F(1,27) = 16.30,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.38. Both main effects were additive as indi-
cated by a non-significant interaction (F < 1). Considered sep-
arately, one-tailed t-tests showed significant differences between
leaders and followers both, for the L-ATI, t(27) = 1.89, p = 0.035,
d = 0.36, and the F-TAI, t(27) = 1.72, p = 0.048, d = 0.33.
DISCUSSION
Experiment 1 investigated intentional binding for social action
effects, i.e., responses of another agent. The results indicate that
the leader of the action sequence did experience intentional bind-
ing for the follower’s action. This finding is especially striking in
light of previous research on the perceived timing of observed
actions that are not performed in response to own actions (as
in the present setup) but rather, independently of any other
agent (Wohlschläger et al., 2003a,b). These previous studies found
either no difference between the estimated onsets of own and
observed actions, or even the reverse pattern, with observed
actions being judged to occur later in time than own actions.
The present setting thus clearly did not only compensate for this
bias but shifted the pattern of estimates toward an underesti-
mation of the follower’s tone-action interval by the (observing)
leader, as compared to the follower him- or herself. It thus seems
as if pre-reflective components of sense of agency do indeed occur
for social action effects even despite the challenges that come with
the social setting.
On closer inspection, however, the design of Experiment 1
seems to lack a critical feature that is often present in real-world
interactions outside the laboratory. For instance, when asking
someone to open a window, the “follower” clearly achieves an
action effect (i.e., the opened window), rather than simply per-
forming a particular movement as was the case in Experiment 1.
Experiment 2 thus introduced an additional component to the
task: The follower’s action now triggered a tone as well, and we
obtained interval estimates for this interval in addition to the two
intervals of Experiment 1. This setting thus provided the oppor-
tunity to replicate the central results of Experiment 1 (stronger
F-TAI binding for leaders than for followers) while at the same
time probing for differential binding for the third interval for the
leader and the follower.
EXPERIMENT 2: INVESTIGATING THE FOLLOWER’S ACTION
EFFECT
Experiment 2 extended the action sequence of Experiment 1 so
that the follower now also produced an effect tone by her or his
keypress and this tone differed in pitch from the leader’s tone. As
for the leader’s effect tone, the follower’s effect occurred after a
variable interval and we label this interval the F-ATI. Participants
either estimated the length of the L-ATI, the F-TAI, or F-ATI. Our
main question was whether the results of Experiment 1 would
replicate in this setting and whether the stronger intentional
FIGURE 2 | Results of Experiment 1 (left panel) and Experiment 2
(right panel). The plots show the mean regression residuals for the
leader’s action-effect-interval (L-ATI), the interval between the leader’s
tone and the follower’s action (F-TAI), and the follower’s action-tone
interval (F-ATI, Experiment 2 only). Negative values indicate shorter
estimates and error bars represent standard errors of paired
differences (SEPD; Pfister and Janczyk, 2013), computed separately for
each interval.
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binding for leaders compared to followers would also transfer to
the additional F-ATI.
This question is related to previous studies that found vicari-
ous agency for the action effects of others in ambiguous situations
(Wegner and Wheatley, 1999; Strother et al., 2010; Obhi and
Hall, 2011a,b). In the present setup, however, it was clear that
the follower ultimately triggered his or her effect tone. For such
observed actions, it is not clear whether or not binding occurs,
with some studies suggesting a negative answer (Engbert et al.,
2007, 2008) and others suggesting a positive one (Obhi and Hall,
2011a, Experiment 2; Poonian and Cunnington, 2013; cf. also
Buehner and Humphreys, 2009).
As a manipulation check, we further wanted to assess how
leaders and followers conceptualized their own and the other
agent’s actions. To this end we developed and administered an
ad-hoc questionnaire that was loosely based on action identifi-
cation theory (Vallacher and Wegner, 1987, 1989) According to
this theory, agents may construe own actions on different levels
of goal-directedness, by either focusing on immediate movements
or, alternatively, on more distal goals. Similarly, we aimed at
assessing whether the participants of Experiment 2 construed the
situation in terms of the responses or any of the corresponding
action effects.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-four volunteers were paid for participation (8 males; all
right-handed; mean age = 23.7 years). They fulfilled the same
criteria as in Experiment 1. All but one participant reported nor-
mal or corrected-to normal vision and hearing; the remaining
participant reported an otitis of the middle ear in the second
session and we therefore did not analyze his data.
Material, apparatus, and procedure
Experiment 2 employed the same design as Experiment 1 (see
Figure 1) with the following modifications. In each trial, the
follower’s reaction produced a tone after a variable interval of
100–600ms (uniformly distributed). Participants were told that
both, the leader’s and the follower’s action-tone interval varied
between 1 and 1000ms. Participants started with a training block
of 12 trials without interval estimates. Next, they underwent three
blocks per to-be-judged interval—the L-ATI, F-TAI, and the F-
ATI—whereas the order of intervals was counterbalanced across
participant pairs. Each block consisted of 24 trials and the first
block of each triplet served as a training block for the respec-
tive interval. The roles of leader and follower were still constant
throughout one half of the experiment, but the two halves were
now held as separate sessions on two successive days. At the end
of each session, participants completed an ad-hoc questionnaire
targeting their perception of the task (see the below).
Post-experimental questionnaire
Each participant of Experiment 2 judged leader and follower
actions after both sessions. If the participant had been the leader
in a session, he or she completed the questionnaire in the leader
role (“How would you describe your own action?” and “How
would you describe the follower’s action?”), and if the participant
had been the follower, he or she completed the questionnaire in
the follower role. For each rating, they had to choose one out of
six descriptions which best matched their perception of the leader
and, separately, the follower role. The six items of the question-
naire described the actions as (1) finger movement, (2) key press,
(3) producing a signal for the follower (leader) or reacting to the
leaders signal (follower), (4) starting an action sequence (leader)
or finishing an action sequence (follower), (5) producing a tone,
and (6) none of the above. For follower actions, these items were
ordered as described above, whereas for leader actions, the order
was 1, 2, 5, 3, 4, and 6.
RESULTS
Residual binding scores
The analysis followed the same strategy as for Experiment 1 and
all test trials with errors (3.1%) were excluded from data analy-
sis. The remaining trials were outlier-corrected (|z| > 2.5; 1.1%)
and entered a linear regression to estimate regression residuals.
The analysis of regression residuals was again motivated by a
substantial correlation of interval length and binding scores, r =
0.49, t(22) = 11.74, p < 0.001 (see Table A1 in the Supplementary
Material for the raw data). Residuals were submitted to a 2 × 3
repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors judge (leader vs. fol-
lower) and to-be-judged interval (L-ATI vs. F-TAI vs. F-ATI) and
we used the multivariate approach to repeated-measures ANOVA
to counter possible violations of sphericity.
The right panel of Figure 2 shows the mean residual binding
scores for all design cells. Leaders again perceived the inter-
vals to be shorter than followers, F(1,22) = 8.02, p = 0.010,
η2p = 0.27, and this effect was qualified by a marginally signifi-
cant interaction, F(1,21) = 2.65, p = 0.094, η2p = 0.20. The main
effect of interval did not approach significance (F < 1). The
interaction was driven by manifest differences between leader
and follower for the L-ATI, t(22) = 1.73, p = 0.049, d = 0.36,
and the F-TAI, t(22) = 2.65, p = 0.007, d = 0.55, but not for
the F-ATI, t(22) = 0.49, p = 0.313, d = 0.10, as indicated by
one-tailed t-tests.
Furthermore, leaders and followers differed slightly regarding
the judgments of their “own” tone: Residual binding scores for
leaders judging the L-ATI (−11ms) were marginally significantly
lower than residual binding scores of followers judging the F-ATI
(−6ms), t(22) = 1.92, p = 0.068, d = 0.040, thus indicating an
asymmetry in intentional binding when intervals of the same type
were compared.
Questionnaire data
The main questionnaire results are shown in Figure 3.
Interestingly, the participants’ judgments mainly depended
on whether they judged their own role or the role of the other
participant, irrespective of the role itself. For observed actions—
leader actions from the follower perspective and follower actions
from the leader perspective–, participants mainly used the labels
of keypresses (2) and, crucially, the task-related description of
signaling a response or responding to the signal (3). The ten-
dency toward this latter description was especially pronounced
for leaders, suggesting that they indeed construed the follower
response as an effect of their preceding action. For performed
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FIGURE 3 | Responses in the post-experimental questionnaire as judged
from the leader’s perspective (top row) and the follower’s perspective
(bottom row). The available answers to describe the respective actions were
(1) finger movement, (2) keypress, (3) signaling response/reacting to the
signal, (4) initiating/completing an action sequence, (5) producing a tone, and
(6) none of the above (chosen only once; not displayed).
actions—leader actions from the leader perspective and follower
actions from the follower perspective—participants mainly used
the labels of keypresses (2) and of producing a tone (5). Again,
this latter option was chosen more often by leaders than by
followers.
These impressions were confirmed by Cochran’s Q-tests across
the four conditions (leader judging the leader action, leader
judging the follower action, follower judging the leader action,
and follower judging the follower action). A separate test was
conducted for each possible answer (1–6), when coding the pres-
ence of this answer as 1 and any other option as 0 for each
condition. These tests showed significant between-conditions dif-
ferences for answer 3 (“signal”), Q(3) = 34.94, p < 0.001, and
answer 5 (“tone”), Q(3) = 15.34, p = 0.002, indicating that these
options differed in frequency across the four conditions. Further,
a marginally significant effect emerged for answer 2 (“keypress”),
Q(3) = 6.44. p = 0.092), whereas the remaining answers were
distributed equally across the conditions (ps> 0.141).
DISCUSSION
Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1 regarding
the leader’s intentional binding for the own action effect and the
follower’s action in terms of reduced interval estimates for both
intervals. Additionally, the results of Experiment 2 did not yield
any differences in intentional binding regarding the follower’s
action effect. More precisely, neither the leader nor the follower
showed any indication of a subjective compression of the F-ATI.
This finding might be taken to indicate that the followers did
not experience much control over the effects that their actions
produced. Such an interpretation would be in line with studies
that showed the perceived timing of action effects to depend on
causal beliefs about having control (Desantis et al., 2011; Haering
and Kiesel, 2012), and the impact of causal beliefs for the pro-
cessing of temporal delays in general (Greville et al., 2013). By
contrast, it is less clear why leaders did not show intentional
binding for the follower’s action effects even though they clearly
showed binding for the follower’s action itself (as indicated by the
lower F-TAI estimates for the leader as compared to the follower).
It seems tempting to explain this null effect by assuming that the
explicit knowledge of follower’s causing the tone counter-acted
intentional binding for the leader. A possible alternative explana-
tion, however, is that the follower’s action effects were merely too
far removed temporally (Haggard et al., 2002; but see Humphreys
and Buehner, 2009). Alternatively, or in addition, intentional
binding might have been reduced by the fact that several events—
the leader’s effect tone and the follower’s response—intervened
between the leader’s action and the followers’ action effects.
The notion that action effects produced by another agent at
one’s command that are far removed from one’s own prior actions
are associated with reduced agency is interesting in the light of
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real-world scenarios involving the chain of command, such as
in organizational hierarchies or in military decision making. It
would be interesting to assess whether individuals higher up in
the chain of command do indeed feel less agency for the actions
committed by those lower down the chain, and whether those
lower down the chain also feel less agency for the consequences
of their actions when they are made in response to a leader’s sig-
nal. The results from Experiment 1 of the present experiment
seem to suggest that the greatest feeling of agency will be felt
by the individual whose direct signal leads to the critical action.
However, these ideas remain highly speculative and given that the
present results do not allow for any firm conclusions regarding
these points, or indeed the general idea of agency for actions tak-
ing place after many intervening steps, we will concentrate on
the effects that were obtained for the L-ATI and the F-TAI in the
following discussion.
A further interesting aspect of the data concerns the par-
ticipants’ responses to the ad-hoc questionnaire. Here, leaders
described their follower’s action by and large in task-related
terms, i.e., as responses to the leader’s signal. It thus seems as if the
leaders construed the follower action indeed as an action effect of
their actions which might have been promoted intentional bind-
ing for such social action effects. We will get back to this point in
the following General Discussion.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Two experiments investigated sense of agency for social action
effects in a task in which participants either had the role of a leader
or the role of a follower in an action sequence. The leader pressed
a key to start off the sequence and produced an effect tone after
a variable action-tone interval. This effect tone served as a go sig-
nal for the second participant (follower) who pressed his or her
key as quickly as possible in response. In Experiment 2, but not in
Experiment 1, the second keypress also triggered an effect tone.
In different blocks of trials, the participants estimated the dura-
tion of three intervals: the L-ATI, the F-TAI, and (in Experiment
2) the F-ATI. Leaders judged the L-ATI and the F-TAI consistently
shorter than their followers across both experiments, representing
intentional binding for both intervals for the leader. Intentional
binding, in turn can be seen as a pre-reflective component of sense
of agency for the corresponding action effects (Moore and Obhi,
2012), i.e., the effect tone for the L-ATI and the follower action
for the F-TAI.
The observation that the leader showed intentional binding
(relative to the follower) not only for his or her own effect tone
but also for the response of the follower, suggests that inten-
tional binding does indeed occur when another person’s action
follows one’s own action. The finding of intentional binding for
such social action effects extends previous reports on the role of
social action effects for effect-based action control (Pfister et al.,
2013), by showing that such effects are not only included in action
control but may also shape perception similarly to action effects
in the physical environment. This notion is also mirrored in the
questionnaire data where leaders described the follower response
mainly in terms of reacting to the leader’s signal.
It should be noted, however, that several factors in the
employed design clearly worked in favor of finding binding effects
for the leader role. One of these factors becomes evident when
considering the exact operationalization of the two roles:Whereas
the leader obviously could choose freely when to start the action
sequence, the follower did not have this free “when” choice (for a
general framework of “when” choices as compared to “what” and
“whether” choices, see Brass and Haggard, 2008). Even though
some results indicated comparable binding for free-choice and
forced-choice responses (Wenke et al., 2009), other findings sug-
gested that at least free “what” choices may promote intentional
binding (Barlas and Obhi, 2013). It could thus be argued that the
observed binding for social action effects mainly emerged because
of the free choice component of the leader’s task. Support for this
speculation comes from recent findings that indicated the impact
of free action choices on effect anticipations to mainly apply to
situations in which action-effect relations are somewhat variable
(Pfister et al., 2010; Pfister and Kunde, 2013)—and such a vari-
ability is clearly present for any type of social action effect due to
reduced contingency and contiguity as compared to effects in the
physical environment.
Furthermore, the leader’s intentional binding of social action
effects might also have been boosted by feelings of having power
over the follower’s behavior. Indeed, power priming has been
shown to affect intentional binding, with low power priming
decreasing intentional binding as compared to high power prim-
ing (Obhi et al., 2012). Whether or not the leaders actually
experienced notable feelings of power over the follower’s actions
cannot be judged from the present experiments, but investigat-
ing the impact of power on the perception of social action effects
seems to be a promising field for further inquiry.
The present observation of intentional binding for social
action effects is also in line with studies that targeted brain
activations for participants who performed interdependently on
leader-follower tasks. For instance, Chaminade andDecety (2002)
employed positron-emission tomography (PET) during a task in
which participants moved a circle on a screen in two different
conditions. In the leader condition, their own circle was followed
by a second circle that was allegedly moved by somebody else,
whereas in the follower condition, they were to follow computer-
generated movements of the second circle that was said to be
moved by another person. Leading and following gave rise to dif-
ferential activity within the right intraparietal sulcus, a region
that has often been associated with sense of agency (e.g., Farrer
and Frith, 2002; Spengler et al., 2009). Although Chaminade and
Decety did not asses any direct or indirect measures of sense of
agency, their results could partly be seen as mirroring sense of
agency for social action effects in the leader role, similar to the
binding effects observed in our experiments.
The present results are only a first step toward understanding
sense of agency for social action effects—a topic that clearly awaits
further investigation. This investigation would ideally target sense
of agency for social actions with various implicit and explicit mea-
sures and at the same time relate these measures to how social
action effects are integrated in human motor control in general.
A further interesting topic seems to be the impact of unexpected
action effects on sense of agency in social settings relative to non-
contingent action-effect relations in the physical world (Moore
et al., 2009a; Wenke et al., 2009; Sidarus et al., 2013). Indeed, the
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possibility and problem-spaces relating to agency for actions in
social contexts is largely unexplored and there are many exciting
opportunities for further research.
In conclusion, social roles like being a leader or a follower
while performing a task together have an impact on one’s sense
of agency, as intentional binding as a pre-reflective component
of sense of agency occurs more strongly in the leader than in
the follower. Most importantly, our results show that sense of
agency does not only occur for physical effects in the environ-
ment, but also for social action effects, i.e., predictable actions of
other agents.
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